The Right to Laziness

Have you noticed that we always speak about the right to leisure, but never about a right to laziness? I wonder if here, in the modern Occident, doing nothing really exists.

Roland Barthes, “Let’s Just be Lazy for Once”

Not much has changed since Barthes asked the question in the 1979 interview with *Le Monde*. Well into the 21st century, we still privilege work and come up with new ways of justifying its indispensability for our well-being, while laziness remains synonymous with rottenness of the mind and malfunctioning of the body. Yet Barthes was not the first to posit the question of the right to be lazy. As Pierre Saint-Amand argues in *The Pursuit of Laziness* (2011), the desire for unproductive idling, or, *paresse*, was one of the strongest undercurrents of the Enlightened thought, “repeatedly contesting the universality of labor and activity,” with *homo otiosus* as the underlying ideal of the Rousseauist model of free thinker. Following this tendency, the end of the 19th century featured an explosion of texts celebrating idleness, the most famous of which was Paul Lafargue’s scandalous anti-work manifesto entitled “The Right to Be Lazy.” In his pamphlet, Lafargue employed the word *paresse*, somewhat provocatively, in the service of a political demand to shorten the average workday, but the particular way in which he employed the idea of not-working in his anti-capitalist argument indicated that *paresse* is a philosophically loaded concept that bears a relation to the notion of freedom. It is this relation that, almost a hundred years later, has been picked up and developed by such French thinkers as Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes. The purpose of this essay is therefore to trace the affinities between modern conceptualizations of laziness in the French thought and Lafargue’s provocative pamphlet.


“The Right to Be Lazy” begins, rather unphilosophically, with a psychological diagnosis of life at the end of the 19th century, which, as Lafargue puts it, is governed by the mania of work:

A strange delusion possesses the working class of the nations where capitalist civilization holds its sway. This delusion drags in its train the individual and the social woes which for two centuries have tortured sad humanity. This delusion is the love of work, the furious passion for work, pushed even to the exhaustion of the vital force of the individual and his progeny. Instead of opposing this mental aberration, the priests, the economists and the moralists, have cast a sacred halo over work. . . . In capitalist society work is the cause of all intellectual degeneracy, of all organic deformity.3

In Lafargue’s view, work is a complete waste of life energy. Beyond being simply tiresome, work is described as a “mental aberration” and degenerative illness of the mind and the body. Work is, in other words, a disorder and a deviation in the management of one’s vital resources, which threatens the mental equilibrium of individuals and entire generations. That work continues to be manically pursued despite its destructiveness owes to its canonization; work masquerades as religion, with everyone being under the spell of a belief that toil is the only route towards humanized existence. Lafargue’s antidote to the debilitating effects of work is therefore: free your time! embrace unproductivity! Be lazy!

What is at stake in his rather immodest proposal is far more than the shortening of the workday, although this is the overt aim of “The Right to be Lazy.” For when Lafargue describes the first model of laziness he wishes to promote, his political view reveals a specific philosophical genealogy. Lafargue finds the ideal of counter-systemic paresse in the figure of a beggar:

[One] rejoices in his admiration for the hardy Andalusian. . . straight and flexible as a steel rod; and the heart leaps at hearing the beggar, superbly draped in his ragged capa, parleying on terms of equality with the duke of Ossuna.4

From a philosophical perspective, Lafargue’s beggar who treats the duke as an equal bears a striking likeness to the figure of the ancient philosopher Diogenes the Cynic, known for having famously replied to king Alexander the Great’s “I am the king,” with an unruly “I am Diogenes, the dog.” The resistance to power communicated in Diogenes’s famous reply also transpires from Lafargue’s image of the Andalusian.

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3 Ibidem, pp. 21-22.
The correspondence makes all the difference as to whether we treat paresse in Lafargue’s text as an empty provocation or as a philosophically loaded concept. There is, Michel Foucault argues in *Government of Self and Others*, a great political potential in the Cynical denouncement of authority. As Foucault puts it, the importance of Diogenes’s response to Alexander the Great was that it established in philosophy a unique model of performing parrhēsia (truth-telling) as political action, whose form of speaking truth to power is that of “exteriority, challenge and derision.” From a Foucauldian perspective, Lafargue’s figure of the Andalusian beggar who does not shy away from speaking to the duke as an equal corresponds with the Cynical paradigm, inasmuch as it articulates the same parrhēsiastic position that is presupposed in Diogenes’s challenge to the sovereign. It is a position which enables the performative enunciation of one’s individual freedom with respect to biopolitical system that recognizes only the kind of life that is a life of labor. This is why, in Lafargue’s vision, the only way towards emancipation from biopolitical order is through abstention from work.

The affinity between Lafargue’s vision and the Cynical paradigm is particularly emphasized when Lafargue describes the beggar’s pose — “straight and flexible as a steel rod,” thus inserting into his otherwise romantic style a reference to the technical register of 19th century metal industry. Because the English translation of Lafargue’s original phrasing actually blurs the significance of his technical metaphor (the fact I discuss later), let us refer for a moment to the French original, where the Andalusian is “droit et elastique comme une tige d’acier” — he’s ‘elastic’ as a rod of steel. In the strictly scientific sense, ‘elastic’ is the opposite of ‘flexible,’ used in the English translation, since in physics ‘elasticity’ is defined by the ratio of stress to strain; a material is more elastic, the more difficult it is to stretch or bend. Scientifically speaking, elasticity denotes resistance rather than flexibility. This scientific meaning thus strengthens the political dimension of Lafargue’s definition of paresse because it connotes the attitude of steel-like indomitability to the changes in labor organization brought about by the Industrial Revolution. At the same time, the resistance inferred in the allegory of the elastic pose of the lazy Andalusian is also of profound philosophical import because it complements the parrhēsiastic model of parleying with power. In Lafargue’s logic, as Marina Van Zuylen observes,

> . . . one of the reasons that *paresse* is such a bold and sane alternative to work is that it can never become part of any organized faith. Unlike indoctrinating labor-worship, it is a condition that is private, not public. It can only be the

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consequence of one’s own (ir)responsibility. This is why it is much wiser, Lafargue suggests, to bask in philosophical paresse — to engage in the type of work that produces only what one needs, adopting a style of life that requires only the immediate fruits of one’s labor.6

In Zuylen’s optics, Lafargue attempts to democratize the Aristotelian notion of leisure, reserved in Aristotle’s Ethics for the upper class — the only social group in Aristotle’s view that is capable of using free time responsibly. Lafargue’s emphasis on paresse rather than leisure is thus a nod towards the working class, who equally deserve free time and whom he believes to be able to loaf wisely and creatively. For Zuylen, this belief makes Lafargue’s proposal a bit too utopian due to his deliberate blindness to the nefarious effects laziness might have on individuals or groups who lack knowledge and resources to use free time to their mental and physical advantage. This is not an infrequent line of accusation among Lafargue’s critics (extended often to the entire Anti-work movement that has sprung from “The Right to be Lazy”), but Lafargue does not seem as blind as Zuylen accuses him of being, for his philosophy of paresse includes a continuum of lazy attitudes, some of which are liberating and humanizing and others counter-emancipatory and unconstructive.

On the one hand, Lafargue puts emphasis on the initial moment of political awareness born out of the experience of laziness. This moment, which after Foucault I called parrhēsiastic, frames laziness as a position of refusal to participate in life under capitalism, that is to say, as a notion of philosophical pertinence to issues broader than free time and leisure, namely, to the issue of individual freedom. The concept of freedom that emerges from Lafargue’s allusions to Diogenes’s resistance stands in sharp contrast to the French model of liberty shaped by the Revolution, in that it locates revolutionary potential in the withdrawal from power-struggle.

This contrast is particularly apparent in the first English translation of “The Right to Be Lazy,” authored by a dedicated American Marxist, Charles Hope Kerr.7 The English version of “droit et elastique comme un tige d’acier,” interpreted as “straight and flexible as a steel rod”8 loses the sense of elasticity as resistance and indomitability. In fact, ‘flexible’ contradicts the parrhēsiastic paradigm, because it denotes amenability — the exact opposite of steeliness

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7 A former Unitarian thinker, and later a dedicated Marxist, whose work gave the Socialist Movement in the U.S. translations of Marxist texts and the first publishing house. Kerr founded the socialist publishing company Charles H. Kerr & Co. in 1886. He brought out many Marxist classics, including the first complete English edition of Marx’s Capital.
8 P. Lafargue, op. cit., p. 23.
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of resistance advocated by Lafargue. This minor interpretive inaccuracy brings into focus an interesting cultural difference between the 19th century discursive conventions in French and English as regards the clustering of indomitability, productivity (work) and unproductivity (laziness). Unlike French, the English language does not permit the commutability between the idea of not-working and the idea of being indomitable. In other words, the separation of adroitness from elasticity, indomitability and elemental resistance to change testifies to radically different visions of laziness and anti-work in the French and the English-speaking cultural milieu. If for Lafargue the political potential of laziness stems from the natural organization of the physical world — to embrace laziness would be as natural as it is for iron to resist strain — Kerr’s translation separates political power of daring from its origin in matter. Daring is thus figured as an artificial pose rather than as man’s natural faculty.

On the other hand, while the image of the lazy Andalusian symbolizes the position of parrhésiastic resistance to capitalism, it is not by any means the only image of laziness in Lafargue’s argument. As argued above, Lafargue’s call to “be lazy” assumes a spectrum of lazy attitudes, which are to be distinguished from the one type of paresse he advocates. One type is paresse-as-fatigue, i.e. a laziness born out of physical exhaustion and inurement to labor. A recurrent image in “The Right to be Lazy” is that of the pale, hollow-eyed, emaciated bodies of mechanical workers, whose exhaustion and weakness is juxtaposed to that of the insatiable “modern Minotaur” of the factory.9 Another type of laziness in “The Right to be Lazy” is paresse-as-overconsumption. Lafargue presents it as an abject body of an overfed capitalist nation-state:

... an enormous female, hairy-faced and bald-headed, fat, flabby, puffy and pale, with sunken eyes, sleepy and yawning... stretching herself out on a velvet couch” while “at her feet [the capitalist] organism of iron, with an ape-like mask, is mechanically devouring men, women and children.10

How different is the image of this lazy body from the image of the indomitable, resilient beggar. The lazy bourgeois body is not even a sexed body; the ‘femelle’ (a hag) is hairy-faced and bald-headed, and utterly devoid of libidinal potency. The physiognomy of its face, depicted in Aristotle’s terms as flabby — or rather, cow-like, from the French ‘avachie’11 (cow-like)12

9 Ibidem, p. 31.
10 Ibidem, p. 67.
12 In his Physiognomonica, Aristotle uses the phrase “the face, when fleshy, indicates laziness, as in cattle.” Aristotle, Physiognomonica, ed. and trans. Th. Loveday and E. Seymour
— betrays a laziness inscribed into the bodily fabric, ‘la paresse absolue’\textsuperscript{13} (absolute laziness\textsuperscript{14}), which went too far, leading the body to a state of decomposition. For indeed, this enormous body stretched on the couch is entirely without life. Its eyes no longer see.

Presented in terms of a loss of \textit{élan vital}, both \textit{paresse}-as-fatigue and \textit{paresse}-as-consumerism mark the extremes of Lafargue’s spectrum of lazy attitudes, which ought not by any means be pursued. The only type of laziness Lafargue calls for, the \textit{parrhēsiatic} laziness-as-indomitability, is located right in the middle of this spectrum, at its null point. It is precisely this idea of null-point positioning, that is, the idea of some elemental neutrality of \textit{paresse} that returns in the discussions of laziness in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century French thought. The ethical philosopher Emmanuel Levinas invokes the notion of \textit{paresse} in his \textit{Existence and Existents} (1947) to define a “position of refusal with regard to existence,” a position “prior” i.e. more fundamental to existence than the very fact of coming into life. There is, thus, in Levinas’s philosophy, the same association of laziness with indomitability, with refusal and with protest against being deprived of the right to choose whether to live in this world or not.\textsuperscript{15}

A similar but more culture-specific philosophy of laziness permeates Roland Barthes’s 1979 “Osons être \textit{paresseux}” (“Let’s Just be Lazy for Once”), which begins with an assertion of a correlation between laziness and resistance, on the example of an educational situation. School, Barthes writes,

\par... is a structure of constraint, and laziness is a means for the pupil to dupe this constraint. The classroom inevitably includes a repressive force, if only because the student has no real interest in the things that are taught there. Laziness can be a way to answer back to this repression.\textsuperscript{16}

For Barthes, therefore, laziness is a mode of resistance to repressive apparatuses, a natural, fundamental position that activates itself in

\textsuperscript{13} P. Lafargue, \textit{Le Droit a La Paresse: Réfutation Du Droit Au Travail de 1848}, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{14} P. Lafargue, \textit{The Right to Be Lazy}, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{15} I discuss the particular philosophy of \textit{paresse} that Levinas develops in \textit{Existence and Existents}, in a forthcoming essay “Laziness as a Philosophical Category” and \textit{The Work of Laziness}.

situations of oppression.\textsuperscript{17} In this instance, Barthes’s language bears a striking resemblance to Levinas’s formulation that \textit{paresse} is a fundamental position of dissent with regard to existence, as well as to Lafargue’s idea of laziness as a form protest against systemic constraints.\textsuperscript{18} But while for Levinas the position of refusal is, essentially, an impossible refusal, that is to say, only a momentary potentiality or a desire, Barthes renders laziness as much more constructive.

At first, this constructiveness is rendered in “Let’s Just Be Lazy” only in personal terms, as Barthes describes his own experience of laziness as oscillating between on the one hand, the painfulness of being out of touch with one’s will (that refuses to be forced to work) and, on the other hand, a euphoric pleasure of being/feeling free to do nothing. For Barthes, laziness as a mixture of blissfulness and pain is thus the purest form of \textit{jouissance}.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, Barthes’s definition of laziness incorporates a rich variety of emotional states, from the depressive sense of “marinading” in one’s thoughts to the exuberance with this “glorious” form of philosophizing.\textsuperscript{20} But as “Let’s Just be Lazy” unfolds, Barthes abandons the tone of intimate confession, and turns to the general question of \textit{paresse} as an ethico-political position, arguing that the idea of doing nothing, of withdrawing from work and action, reveals something very important about contemporary modes of resisting social pressure to participate in socio-economic reality. For Barthes — and here again he comes very close to Levinas — true laziness is not just about not-doing-anything, but about leaving the choice between doing and not-doing open.

True laziness would be basically a laziness about “not deciding” whether or not “to be there.” Much like the class dunce sitting at the back of the classroom who has no other trait than being there. They don’t participate, nor are they excluded. They’re there, period, like a sort of heap. . . .

To be there, but not to decide anything. There we could find certain tenets of Tolstoy’s ethics. To the degree in which we might ask ourselves if we have the right to be lazy in the face of evil. Tolstoy said that yes, indeed, this would still be the best possibility left, since answering back to evil with another form of evil is not acceptable. Needless to say that, today, such

\textsuperscript{17} Barthes’s original words are „c’est une donnee fondamentale et comme naturelle de la situation scolaire” (\textit{ibidem}, p. 760)


a form of morality has been completely discredited. And if we went even further, laziness might seem like a high philosophical solution on the side of evil. Not answering back, though once again, today’s society doesn’t really put up very well with neutral attitudes. Laziness is intolerable then, as if this were the basic principal evil.21

The reflection on laziness leads Barthes to the questions of ethics. Reaching towards Tolstoy and Zen philosophy, Barthes wonders if Western thought offers any means of thinking about ‘withdrawal from action’ outside of the registers of moral solicitation, be it as an mode of ethical neutrality, as a mode of resistance to repression of possibilities to remain ethically neutral by biopolitical systems of governance, or as a mode of desire for that neutrality.

The idea of ethical neutrality finds further elaboration in Barthes’s *The Neutral*, a set of lectures at the Collège de France he delivered in years 1977–1978, where the titular category performs the function of what Blanchot has called “the limit of thought.”22 For Barthes, an attempt at neutrality one of “those obscure gestures, by which a culture rejects something that, for it, would be the Exterior.”23 The desire for the neutral that finds its intellectual and physical manifestation in *paresse* is precisely that which the Western culture rejects and represses, because through its enunciation of exteriority with regard to normativity, which Foucault associates with acts of parrhesia, *paresse* violates Western norms and structures of governance.

Speaking of normativity and Michel Foucault, it is impossible not to mention, especially within a book dedicated to French intellectual tradition, his famous argument from *Discipline and Punish* about institutionalized proscription of all forms of idleness as delinquency and mental disorder. From the 16th century onwards, idleness and laziness served as categories of social repression,24 while the demarcation line between work and idleness gradually “replaced the exclusion of leprosy.”25

The asylum was substituted for the lazar house, in the geography of haunted places as in the landscape of the moral universe. The old rites of excommunication were revived, but in the world of production and

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23 *Ibidem*.
commerce. It was in these places of doomed and despised idleness, in this space invented by a society which had derived an ethical transcendence from the law of work, that madness would appear and soon expand until it had annexed them. [...] It was in this other world, encircled by the sacred powers of labor, that madness would assume the status we now attribute to it.26

According to Foucault, the social discourse inaugurated in the 16th century rendered idleness no longer an irrational disposition received from elsewhere, as in Evagrius Ponticus’s conception of Daemon Meridianus, but as a social stigma. The segregationist ethos, persisting until the 19th century, when proscription extended to all forms of social uselessness, only this time, under the category of criminal acts. 19th century penitentials listed “passivity” and “shame or honour [sic!], through cowardice, that is to say, laziness” among the most incorrigible and therefore dangerous pathologies.”27

If we use Foucault’s historicist findings as the background of Lafargue’s “Right to be Lazy,” the provocativeness of Lafarguesque slogan acquires yet another interpretation; in the times of militant proscriptions of idleness during the technological revolution, any positive reference to laziness in the public discourse, such as “The Right to be Lazy” must have been as scandalous as it was revolutionary. Especially given that, as historians of labor point out, criminalization of all forms of inactivity at the end of the 19th century ran concurrently (and was closely linked to) the technological evolution of new modes of production and fluctuant labor demographics in urban and rural areas of Europe alike.28

In Discipline and Punish, Foucault focuses on the practices of disciplining the human body, and explains the contingency of body politics with economy. The “docile body” is

. . . involved a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labor power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection . . . the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body.29

26 Ibidem.
29 M. Foucault, Discipline & Punish, p. 25.
It is only logical therefore that from Lafargue to Barthes the discourse on *paresse* is loaded with reference to somaesthetic experiences of bodily insubordination. The body of Lafargue’s Andalusian beggar is full of untamed robustness; its indomitability expressed in a total affirmation of his body — in pride. And Barthes devotes quite a number of remarks to the undisciplined body in both the *Le Monde* essay and *The Neutral*. One of references mentioned earlier in this text is the remark about euphoric states and *jouissance* achieved in laziness, both of which are clear transgressions of the normativist pedagogies of the body:

At a certain time in my life, I allowed myself, after my afternoon nap . . . a little of this kind of euphoric laziness, which is harmless. I used to take up, without getting too tense, my body’s orders, which was at that moment, a little sleepy and not very willing to get up. I didn’t try to work, letting myself go. [translation slightly altered]30

Describing the state of temporary suspension of movement and will, Barthes approximates Levinas’s definition of *paresse* as that important moment between “the clear duty of getting up and the putting of the foot down off the bed”31 which condenses in itself some truth about the dialectic of freedom and volition. Similarly, later in “Let’s Just be Lazy,” Barthes describes the resistance of school dunce as the heaping body, a relaxed pose whose almost caricatural looseness communicates organic resistance to discipline. Finally, in *The Neutral*, Barthes elaborates on a number of bodily states associated with laziness, such as lassitude, weariness, stillness, and sleep. In the section devoted to weariness as creation, Barthes given an example of Pyrrho, a Greek Skeptic (365 B.C. — 275 B.C.), who

. . . was worn out by all the words of the Sophists, and a little like Gide, asked to be left in peace. In so doing, in assuming his weariness — the speech of others as excessive, as oppressive — he created something . . . he created the Neutral — as if he had read Blanchot! Weariness is thus creative. . . . The right to weariness . . . thus shares in the new: new things are both out of lassitude — from being fed up.32

What is born out of lassitude and laxation is thus not what Barthes at some point of *The Neutral* calls the passivity of ‘neither-norism,’ for there is nothing radical about the mechanical withdrawal of the neither-nor

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approach.33 The product of lassitude is a radically “active” and “productive” neutrality, which Barthes defines as attention without arrogance, participation without involvement, and resistance without violence.34 It should not surprise us therefore that Barthes’s example of perfect neutrality is Diogenes, “the Cynic, the man of Im-pertinence,” whose figure while “not the least in the service of power, doesn’t stay permanently in the service of contestation.”35 Similarly to Lafargue, who reached for the Cynical model of parrhēsia in order to propose a radical but non-violent mode of counteract power structures, Barthes invokes Diogenes to stress that the greatest virtue of paresse is its nondogmatism. As history demonstrates, this virtue is also the source of its ongoing scandalousness.

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The Right to Laziness

Abstracts

“The Right to Laziness” explores the conceptual potential of the notion of paresse as featured in contemporary French philosophy, particularly in the ethical thought of Emmanuel Levinas and the theory of neutrality by Roland Barthes. I demonstrate how the concept of paresse serves as a concept-metaphor for denoting a specific philosophical position of dissensus or parrhēsia, which according to Michel Foucault is the only political position of protest available from within the discourse of philosophy.

Keywords: laziness, paresse, contemporary French philosophy, Emmanuel Levinas, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault.

33 Ibidem, p. 80.
34 Ibidem, p. 81.
35 Ibidem, p. 121.